John Stewart proposes we study what we can call "deep social cognition" (DSC), as opposed to the mere embedding or extending or modifying of cognition by social factors, as Stewart characterizes the tradition of "social cognition" studies to date.
DSC claims that for humans our basic or non-empirical categories-space, time, identity, equality, and so on-are relative to social practices. One could say that DSC takes up the mind-in-life continuity thesis (Thompson, 2007) and explores it relative to human cognition. To fight the representation lists, early enactivists insisted that whatever the content of cognitive processes enacted in the coconstitution of organismic value and environmental affordance, those contents were in fact enacted and not objective reflections (realism) or subjective creations (idealism).
A common enactivist strategy here was to study single-celled organisms (e.g., E. Coli). If they displayed cognition qua sense-making, then the ground floor of the mind-in-life continuity thesis would be established and it would then be a matter of studying qualitative shifts in the continuum of organismically rooted cognition: consciousness vs. sentience, selfconsciousness vs. "mere" consciousness, etc. Once the baseline is established, however, Stewart implies, there has to be a follow up investigation of the correlation in human beings of historical/social forms of life and basic categories.
After this mise-en-scène, in the remainder of the comment I will raise some points not so much in criticism as in hopes of offering further research avenues.
(1) Might gene expression regulation in populations of bacteria allow us to think the evolutionary depth origins of DSC? For an introduction to the issue of bacterial quorum sensing, see Joint et al. (2007) . For an ambitious attempt at articulating the "origins of sociable life," see Hyrd (2009 (Hatfield, 2012) . For Lange, however, the conditions of possibility of experience are species-specific adaptations. Lange in turn influenced Nietzsche's position that affective-cognitive patterns are relative to "forms of life" (Stack, 1991; Cox, 1999 Read (2014) , with the remark that Read also looks to the Italian Autonomia thinkers, in particular Virno's reading of Marx on the "general intellect" as it relates to the post-industrial economy. This field of thought bears on Stewart's discussion of financial capitalism, which cannot be underestimated as a vitally important philosophical/political topic, just as nuclear power and global climate change rose to the forefront of thought in the eras in which they assumed dangerous potentials.
